The influx of Palestinian refugees since 1948 had grown to over 400,000 by 1975. These refugees soon realized that their return to Palestine hinged on illusions promoted by Arab regimes to sustain their rule. They began organizing themselves politically and then militarily. Similarly, the impoverished Shiite community began to mobilize to demand rights and escape deprivation. The flow of money masked public discontent, and Lebanon appeared to be at the peak of its economic boom while racing toward disaster.
The Lebanese state attempted to confront the growing Palestinian military presence, which had deep roots within the Muslim community. Yet it faced immense Arab pressure, reinforced by the wave of Arab nationalism, and culminated in the 1969 Cairo Agreement. This accord allowed Palestinians to establish an autonomous armed presence, effectively replacing the Lebanese state's authority.
The state's failure drove Lebanese parties and organizations to arm themselves. Doubts grew, especially since Palestinian leaders themselves could not enforce the Cairo Agreement’s terms on all factions. Repeated Israeli bombings of southern villages triggered mass Shiite displacement toward Beirut. Many viewed the state as either powerless or complicit. The displaced settled around Beirut in expanding belts of poverty—fertile grounds for leftist parties seeking to upend the system. Arab rivalries spilled onto Lebanese soil, hastening the collapse of Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance.
Lebanon found itself torn between pan-Arab ideologies. Its aspiration to be a cultural meeting point between Arab, Western, and Mediterranean civilizations was undermined. Lebanon’s freedoms, envied by others in the region, were exploited to plot against state authority. On January 1, 1965, Fatah launched its first operation against Israel from Lebanese soil, revealing Palestinian military activity in Lebanon. This raised alarms in Beirut, which feared the impact on domestic balance.
Later in 1965, the Lebanese army arrested Fatah cadre Jalal Kaoush, who was declared dead by suicide on January 11, 1966, causing turmoil in the camps. Yasser Arafat himself was detained in 1966 and released after Syrian mediation. After the 1967 war, relations calmed, particularly after Arab states recognized Palestinian resistance. But Israel’s attack on Beirut Airport on December 28, 1968 reignited tensions. The army faced criticism and tightened control over camps.
The Crisis and the Cairo Agreement
On April 23, 1969, the crisis peaked when Lebanese security forces cracked down on a pro-Palestinian protest, killing 11 and wounding 82. The resulting government crisis dragged on for months with armed clashes in the South and Bekaa. On May 30, President Charles Helou condemned the Palestinian armed presence. Prime Minister-designate Rashid Karami criticized Helou’s stance, then withdrew in protest, plunging the state into further crisis.
The crisis lasted six months, during which severe clashes occurred in Nahr al-Bared camp (August 28), and in the South (October 18). Syrian-backed al-Sa‘iqa militia attacked border posts on October 23, and Palestinian fighters occupied police stations in Beirut. Lebanon appealed to Egyptian President Nasser for mediation. This led to the Cairo Agreement on November 3, 1969, which regulated Palestinian military activity in Lebanon.
Though the agreement was meant to be secret, its terms were often violated. The PLO blamed “undisciplined elements,” yet Lebanese doubts grew.
Continued Clashes
Despite the agreement, clashes continued sporadically—between the army and Palestinians or between civilians and fighters. One major confrontation took place in Kahhaleh on March 24, 1970, killing 18 Palestinians.
In 1972, after the influx of fighters from Jordan and the Israeli invasion of Arkoub, tensions grew. On June 13, Raymond Edde called for the abolition of the Cairo Agreement, provoking intense political debate. On June 21, Israeli forces invaded Arkoub, killing 48 and wounding 45. On June 23, they bombed Deir al-Ashayer (50 killed, 10 wounded), prompting the PLO to suspend its operations.
On September 5, Palestinians carried out the Munich operation during the Olympics in Germany. Eleven days later, on September 16, Israel invaded South Lebanon again (118 killed). Despite resisting the Israelis, the Lebanese army was harshly criticized, straining relations with Palestinians. More Arab mediation ensued, but new clashes broke out on December 8–9, leading to another ceasefire.
May 1973: War Between the Army and Palestinian Fighters
On April 10, 1973, an Israeli commando unit led by Ehud Barak assassinated three senior Fatah leaders in Beirut: Kamal Nasser, Kamal Adwan, and Mohammad Yusuf al-Najjar (killed with his wife). The attack also left 4 Lebanese dead and 29 wounded, with 40 Palestinian casualties.
Prime Minister Saeb Salam demanded the army chief’s dismissal; when President Frangieh refused, Salam resigned. His successor, Amin al-Hafiz, failed to calm tensions as Arafat rejected any army role in camp security. On May 1, Palestinians kidnapped three Lebanese soldiers, and rejected all mediation. On May 2, fierce fighting broke out near Beirut, resulting in 12 Lebanese and 19 Palestinian deaths, with many more wounded.
On May 3, Lebanese warplanes bombed Bourj al-Barajneh camp. Army units also clashed with the Palestinian Liberation Army that crossed from Syria into the Bekaa. On May 8, a failed ceasefire led to Hafiz’s resignation; Takieddin Solh took over. Syria closed its borders. A new ceasefire deal was signed, accompanied by martial law and curfews. On May 23, martial law was lifted after the Melkart Agreement was signed on May 17, which discussed—but did not amend—the Cairo Agreement.
The death toll: 108 killed, 224 wounded, 1160 homes destroyed. A new normalization agreement between Frangieh and Arafat on June 1 lifted the curfew. Despite calm, mistrust remained. Armed skirmishes continued. On May 16, 1974, Israel launched a deadly attack in South Lebanon with over 300 casualties. Beirut stayed silent to avoid conflict with the PLO. Frangieh even promised amnesty to fighters arrested in May 1973.
Christian parties escalated armament, leading to major clashes with Palestinians on July 29, 1974, in Dekwaneh, killing 10 and injuring 40. Takieddin Solh resigned on September 22. Rashid Solh replaced him on October 30. In Rabat, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. The UN welcomed Arafat in November. Frangieh addressed the UN as spokesman for the Arab cause, returning to Lebanon with a fragile ceasefire.
1975–1978: Toward Civil War
In early 1975, after a major Israeli attack in the South citing fedayeen operations, Kataeb Party leader Pierre Gemayel sent President Frangieh a harsh letter on December 24, criticizing the state’s inaction toward “Palestinian violations.” The country was divided over the army’s role. Despite its training, the army was paralyzed, trying to avoid sectarian splits. Muslim and leftist critics clashed with Christian supporters of the army.
The army clashed with Palestinian fighters in 1973 and restored order in Tripoli by crushing an outlaws’ mini-state. Lebanon was politically and socially on edge, awaiting the first spark. In this climate, on February 26, 1975, fishermen in Sidon protested against a fishery company. MP Maarouf Saad, a protest leader, was wounded by gunfire and died on March 6, wrapped in a Palestinian flag. His death sparked clashes in Sidon, riots in Tripoli, and barricades in Beirut. By March 1, 19 were dead, including soldiers, and 91 wounded.
April 13, 1975: The Outbreak
On April 13, a bus carrying Palestinians was ambushed in Ain el-Remmaneh, where Pierre Gemayel was attending mass. 27 Palestinians were killed, 19 wounded. Palestinians blamed the Kataeb; the Kataeb said they had been provoked. Earlier that day, two Kataeb members had been killed by unknown assailants. Gunfire and armed men spread across Beirut. The incident marked the official start of the Lebanese Civil War.
The Seven Rounds of Fighting
First Round (April 13 – June 30, 1975):
Fighting erupted between Christian parties (mainly Kataeb and NLP’s Tigers) and Palestinian factions. The crisis escalated into civil war. It ended with the formation of a six-member “Salvation Government” led by Rashid Karami.
Second Round (July 1 – September 24, 1975):
A short ceasefire collapsed by early September with heavy clashes destroying central Beirut. A “National Dialogue Committee” of 20 members was formed.
Third Round (September 25, 1975 – February 13, 1976):
Political reform talks continued. Front lines dissolved as Christian factions, the Lebanese National Movement, and Palestinian resistance fought over territories. The conflict intensified in January. A Syrian-brokered reform agreement was reached by round’s end.
Fourth Round (February 14 – March 11, 1976):
The “Constitutional Document” was announced. Syria mediated, but two issues remained: no national unity government, and the army continued disintegrating. This round ended with Lt. Ahmad al-Khatib’s failed coup to reunify the army.
Fifth Round (March 12 – May 31, 1976):
Khatib’s failed coup triggered a shift. He demanded Frangieh’s resignation. Though Frangieh stayed, Elias Sarkis was elected president. Simultaneously, Kamal Jumblatt launched an offensive in Mount Lebanon, heightening the rift between his movement and Syria.
Sixth Round (June 1 – September 22, 1976):
Syria intervened militarily against the PLO and National Movement. The Arab League sent a symbolic Arab Deterrent Force. Tal al-Zaatar camp fell to Christian militias and the Lebanese Army—a turning point. Frangieh’s term ended.
Seventh Round (September 23 – December 9, 1976):
Elias Sarkis took office. Syria launched another offensive against the PLO and National Movement. At the Riyadh summit (October 16), Arab leaders formed the Arab Deterrent Force, largely Syrian. A new government under Salim al-Hoss was formed. The civil war “ended,” but tensions remained.
Clashes Between the Lebanese Forces and Syrian Army – The Rise of Bashir Gemayel (1977–August 1978)
Syria’s Shift Toward Full Control
Syria redefined its mission—from peacekeeping to controlling Lebanese politics. Damascus aimed to dismantle the Lebanese Front and impose direct authority over Christian areas. The Lebanese Forces, led by Bashir Gemayel, resisted.
Syrian forces encircled East Beirut.
Syria used political proxies to fracture the Lebanese Front.
Bashir was targeted for isolation and elimination.
Fragmenting the Christian Front – The Ehden Example
In mid-1978, Syria escalated intra-Christian conflicts. The Ehden massacre—where MP Tony Frangieh and his family were killed—helped Syria exploit rifts. The Marada were co-opted by Damascus and pulled from the united Christian front.
Toward War – Prelude to the Hundred Days
By late 1977, Syria provoked Lebanese Forces in East Beirut—Sodeco, Museum area, Rmeil. After gradual escalation failed, Syria launched a massive assault on Ashrafieh in July 1978. The siege lasted 100 days.
East Beirut Stands – Birth of Armed Christian Resistance
Despite the odds, the Lebanese Forces repelled Syria. Public support turned East Beirut into a Christian symbol of resistance.
It was more than defense; it was defiance of Syrian domination.
Bashir Gemayel emerged as a national Christian leader.
Aftermath – Post-Hundred Days
Syria failed to capture East Beirut.
A clear East-West divide emerged in the capital.
The Lebanese Forces evolved into a sovereign military-political force.
The Marada were sidelined, shifting Christian balance.
The initial spark of armed confrontations did not occur on that particular day, but the official narrative of the war holds that the Lebanese Civil War broke out in April 1975 following the “bus incident.” However, this simplification of the war’s beginnings may in itself be an attempt to obscure the truth. After a two-month ceasefire, armed clashes resumed in September. These intermittent confrontations became known as “rounds,” and their number reached seven between April and September 1975.
On September 11, 1975, the town of Beit Mellat in Akkar, whose population is predominantly Maronite, was subjected to a violent armed attack. The assault resulted in several casualties and the burning of the church and 65 homes. The unofficial toll was eight martyrs and dozens of wounded, most of whom were elderly and minors.
The town witnessed one of the most severe waves of displacement in the region, with half of its residents forced to flee: around 200 families sought refuge in Keserwan, while another 200 fled to Syria. According to testimonies, the attackers forced the town’s residents to publicly convert to Islam at gunpoint, and they complied under duress. Meanwhile, women among the attackers were ululating during the assault.
The assassination of four Kataeb youths in the Fanar area by the Sa'iqa forces stationed near Tel al-Zaatar triggered chaotic reactions in Beirut the following day. The events of that day came to be known as Black Saturday.
As clashes escalated and the intensity of battles increased—with the appearance of new weapons in the hands of the fedayeen—Christian and Lebanese partisan organizations began setting up rudimentary training camps to teach young Lebanese men and women how to defend themselves.
On December 14, Lebanese and Christian groups launched a military campaign aimed at reducing the risks posed by Palestinian camps, such as the Dbayeh camp. On December 18, these Lebanese and Christian armed groups stormed the areas of Al-Maslakh and Karantina.
On December 20, following President Hafez al-Assad’s decision to intervene directly in the Lebanese crisis, units of the Palestinian Liberation Army—commanded by Syrian officers—crossed the Lebanese border with around 3,000 men and supported the PLO in the siege of Zahle. By January, fighters from the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian factions had succeeded in taking control of 70% of Lebanese territory.
Palestinian factions from the Sa'iqa forces and the Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army, along with militias from the National Movement, besieged the towns of Damour and Jiyeh. The attackers systematically destroyed both towns and committed massacres against their inhabitants, who were forced to abandon their homes.
The Lebanese Army had disintegrated along sectarian lines, and with the implicit support of Fatah, Sunni Muslim Lieutenant Ahmed Al-Khatib announced in January 1976 that several units of the Lebanese Army had come together to form the Arab Lebanese Army.
On February 14, 1976, President Suleiman Frangieh and Prime Minister Rashid Karami visited Damascus, where they reached an agreement on the Constitutional Document, which Frangieh subsequently presented to the Lebanese people. The agreement was proposed amid intense battles and the division of Beirut.
Sunni Muslim Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al-Ahdab seized control of the radio and television stations in Beirut and declared himself the interim ruler of Lebanon.
Fighters from the Palestine Liberation Organization and the militias of the National Movement—particularly the Sunni Murabitoun—took control of Kataeb militia positions in the hotel district of central Beirut. This marked the full division of the capital into East and West along the Green Line, which stretched from Ain El-Remmaneh and Chiyah along the Damascus Highway, through Martyrs’ Square, to the western gate of the port. This military, political, and sectarian division lasted for 15 years.
Following the near-total absence of the state from various regions, the steadily deteriorating security situation, and the growing influence of Palestinian organizations and their allies, calls began to emerge for unifying the military command and arms of the Lebanese Christian parties. The term "Lebanese Forces" was used for the first time during the Battle of Metn to refer to the alliance of Christian militias, which at the time lacked any clear organizational structure.
The Arab Lebanese Army and the Joint Forces launched an attack on the Metn district, advancing from Mount Sannine to the town of Mtein. The offensive came to a halt after reports emerged about large-scale preparations being organized to repel the attack by Lebanese armed forces from various regions, particularly from within the Metn area itself.
The Syrian army advanced into the Bekaa Valley, Akkar, and northern Lebanon under the pretext of restoring peace, and its forces spread toward Mount Lebanon with the implicit approval of U.S. President Gerald Ford’s administration and Israel. Pierre Gemayel and former President Camille Chamoun supported the Syrian intervention, while the more radical wing of the Kataeb Party, the National Liberal Party, and other smaller Christian organizations criticized the Christian leadership’s leniency toward this armed Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Notably, the Syrian entry was not made at the request of any party but was imposed through military pressure and, at times, direct intervention against cities, towns, and regions under Christian leadership.
At dawn on July 5, 1976, large forces composed of Palestinian factions, tribal groups, and Syrian-aligned parties launched a wide-scale assault on the town of Chekka. These forces, estimated in the thousands, advanced through the hills of Kfarhazir, the plain of Anfeh, Ras Nhash, and Hamat, reaching the Chekka tunnel, while another Palestinian group carried out amphibious landings on the shores of Hari. Within less than two hours, Chekka was completely surrounded and bombarded with thousands of shells. The town’s defense was left to only a few dozen Lebanese resistance fighters who stood against the sweeping invasion.
At the start of the Battle of Tel al-Zaatar, the Kataeb’s military commander, William Hawi, was killed in action. On the same day, Bachir Gemayel was elected head of the Kataeb Security Council.
The Tel al-Zaatar operation was carried out by six different militias: Al-Tanzim, the Tigers, the Kataeb, the Guardians of the Cedars, the Lebanese Youth Movement, and the Infantry and Artillery Units of the Lebanese Army composed of Christian officers, led by Major Fouad Malik.
The attack was coordinated through a joint military command council that included Bachir Gemayel and Fouad Roukoz (Kataeb), Dany Chamoun and Nabil Karam (Tigers), Fawzi Mahfouz (Al-Tanzim), and Etienne Sakr (Guardians of the Cedars).
On July 20, President Hafez al-Assad stood at Damascus University before the local administration bodies to deliver his famous speech, in which he recounted the story of his army's entry into Lebanon. He stated at the time that when he ordered his forces to enter Lebanon under the name of the Palestinian Liberation Army, he did not seek permission from anyone. He only contacted President Suleiman Frangieh after the forces were already inside Lebanon, merely to inform him of the move.
With the end of the Battle of Tel al-Zaatar, the need for a unified military body became evident. Bachir Gemayel met with Fawzi Mahfouz, leader of Al-Tanzim, to advance the project of unifying the Christian militias. A few days later, he convened the leaders of the militias that had participated in the Tel al-Zaatar battle to lay the foundations for merging them under a single military command. They agreed to establish a new military organization: the Lebanese Forces.
The declared goal of the Lebanese Forces was to liberate Lebanese territory from all foreign troops. The structure included a unified leadership council composed of representatives from the Kataeb, the Tigers, Al-Tanzim, and the Guardians of the Cedars, along with a Chief of Staff. Decisions were made by absolute majority, with the Kataeb and the Tigers jointly retaining veto power. Parties appointed members to the council for one year, after which the council would elect a Commander-in-Chief and a Deputy Commander.
The organizational focus was placed on structuring the armed forces, unifying their uniforms and barracks, inventorying their weapons, and placing them under the authority of the unified leadership. The council was officially established on August 30, 1976, with Colonel Zouhair Al-Rachid appointed as Chief of Staff.
In parallel with the formation of the Lebanese Forces, the Lebanese Front was established in January 1977 as a political council representing the Christian leadership in Lebanon. The Front’s charter emphasized the preservation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and political independence and expressed the Maronite leaders’ willingness to consider certain amendments to the National Pact in favor of the Muslim community. Bachir Gemayel, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, attended the Front’s meetings only when military matters were discussed.
The Syrian forces in Lebanon, operating under the framework of the Riyadh Agreement, established checkpoints in Christian areas. Bachir Gemayel quickly voiced sharp criticism of the violations committed by Syrian soldiers. On January 24, he organized a strike in East Beirut to protest the Syrian military’s deployment in the area.
Later, Bachir Gemayel was arrested at a Syrian checkpoint in the East, and he was only released after the intervention of a high-ranking Syrian officer.
The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt on March 16, 1977, along with two of his bodyguards, was carried out by unknown assailants who were later revealed to be members of Syrian intelligence. In the aftermath, the Christians of the Chouf area were subjected to instinctive acts of revenge that claimed the lives of approximately 177 unarmed civilians, the majority of whom were Christians.
Bachir Gemayel was re-elected as Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Forces, while Nabil Karam assumed the position of Chief of Staff, succeeding Colonel Rachid. The Unified Command Council suspended its administrative projects, and the Christian militias underwent intensive military training in preparation for the upcoming confrontation with the Syrian army.
The beginning of direct confrontations with the Syrian army involved Kataeb groups from the Bsharri area led by Samir Geagea, along with central command units.
Bachir Gemayel was re-elected as Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Forces, while Nabil Karam assumed the position of Chief of Staff, succeeding Colonel Rachid. The Unified Command Council suspended its administrative projects, and the Christian militias underwent intensive military training in preparation for the upcoming confrontation with the Syrian army.
The Lebanese Army, under the command of officers Samir Al-Ashqar and Ibrahim Tannous, clashed with Syrian forces that had set up a checkpoint in front of the Military Academy in the Fayadiyeh barracks. The confrontation resulted in a significant number of casualties, particularly among the Syrians. In retaliation, Syrian forces launched a brutal shelling campaign on the Fayadiyeh barracks that lasted several days. Shortly thereafter, the Tanzim and the Tigers militias joined the battle, engaging in street fighting against Syrian forces in Ashrafieh and Ain El-Remmaneh.
The events of Faydiyeh revealed the Syrian regime’s true stance on the conflict, as its role shifted into that of an occupying army. Efforts then began to divide the Lebanese Front. Shortly after, former President Suleiman Frangieh criticized the Lebanese Front’s growing cooperation with Israel. The rift between Frangieh and the Kataeb Party deepened, and following a series of incidents, Kataeb official Joud El-Bayeh was assassinated in Zgharta on June 7, 1978.
The mediation attempt by Maronite Patriarch Antonios Khreich failed, prompting the Kataeb Party to decide to retaliate against Frangieh’s attacks on its leaders and supporters in northern Lebanon.
This led to the Ehden incident on June 13, 1978, in which Tony Frangieh, the son of Suleiman Frangieh, was killed following a confrontation decision made by the Kataeb Political Bureau in response to the killing of Joud El-Bayeh.
These acts of revenge by Frangieh’s gunmen resulted in the displacement of Kataeb supporters from northern villages. Most of them sought refuge in the monastery of Mayfouq–Byblos, where they were sheltered by the monks. These developments directly led to the establishment of the Qattara barracks under the leadership of Samir Geagea.
A massacre was carried out by the Syrian army in the towns of Al-Qaa, Ras Baalbek, and Jdeidet Al-Fakiha.
According to a classified report received by Lebanese security agencies at the time, around 6:00 PM on Tuesday, June 27, elements of the Syrian Special Units, led by an officer with the rank of Major named Ali Deeb, were seen in the town of Al-Qaa removing their military uniforms and putting on civilian clothes. They then entered neighborhoods in the town of Ras Baalbek, where they abducted a group of six young men. At the same time, another group entered Jdeidet Al-Fakiha and took five others. A force from the same unit raided the town of Al-Qaa carrying a list with the names of some of its residents and arrested 15 young men from their homes.
According to the report, many locals recognized the armed men and even spoke with some of them. A woman from the village of Bazaliyyeh in Baalbek told a member of the Lebanese security forces that she saw Syrian military vehicles transporting civilians east of the town, in the Wadi al-Raiyan area. Later, she heard intense gunfire and then saw the vehicles returning empty. Based on her information, the Lebanese security officer went to the indicated location and found the bodies of 26 young men, handcuffed behind their backs, lying on the ground, riddled with bullets.
The Hundred Days War began, and by mid-Tishreen (October), it had become clear that the Syrian war against the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Front had failed to achieve its objectives. The UN Security Council called for a ceasefire, and the Lebanese Forces interpreted the Council’s statement as a form of international recognition of their status.
Through the Hundred Days War, the Lebanese Forces succeeded in securing a political victory and strengthening their military position in East Beirut. The conflict also marked the rapid rise of Bachir Gemayel.
Fragments of the Struggle
Report
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Lebanese Forces emerged during the events of the Two-Year War due to the urgent need for a military institution capable of filling the vacuum left by the imbalance of armed power between the two components of Lebanese society. On one side stood the Christian Lebanese political parties and groups, mostly right-wing and enjoying the support of the vast majority of Christians—especially the Maronites. This camp saw it as its duty to fight in order to prevent the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its local allies from taking control of the state.
The right-wing camp included the Kataeb Party, the National Liberal Party, Guardians of the Cedars, Al-Tanzim, and the Marada Movement, in addition to factions of the Lebanese Army following its disintegration at the beginning of 1976. Other Christian figures and parties—such as Raymond Edde, the Armenian parties, and the Constitutional Party—opposed this camp and remained neutral.
The opposing front consisted of the Palestinian organizations supported by the majority of Muslims and progressive parties such as the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, as well as Arab nationalist movements like the Al-Murabitoun and groups aligned with Damascus, including the breakaway faction of the Lebanese Army known as the Army of Arab Lebanon, led by Ahmad al-Khatib.
At the Arab and international levels, the first camp was supported by Egypt until January 1976, then by Syria from June 1976 onward (and earlier via the Palestine Liberation Army and Al-Sa’iqa), in addition to Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and the Soviet Union, which did not condemn Syria’s direct intervention in June 1976.
Several international actors officially expressed their support for Lebanon’s unity and rejection of its partition, including France, the Vatican, the United States, Syria itself, Saudi Arabia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
The military imbalance between the two halves of Lebanese society should have been addressed by the Lebanese Army and other state security institutions, including the Internal Security Forces, General Security, and Customs. However, the lack of political consensus at the top of the Lebanese leadership on the army’s role in confronting the armed Palestinian presence created the vacuum.
The left, including its representatives within the Lebanese government, rejected the assignment of security responsibilities to the army, all while turning a blind eye to the behavior of the Palestinian factions throughout the country.
It was well known that, since 1968, Palestinian organizations had established an armed state within the Lebanese state, particularly in the Arkoub region in the South, where they created a military zone called “Fatahland”, from which Lebanese security forces—especially the army—were banned.
The Palestinian forces also arrested and detained Lebanese citizens, moved out of their camps, and began renting luxury apartments in Beirut and other cities, forming a complete military system and intervening in Lebanese internal affairs—all with the backing of a large segment of the Lebanese left.
The Palestinian organizations argued that remaining confined to the camps exposed them to Israeli attacks, which is why they expanded beyond them. In 1973, for example, when Israel raided Beirut and assassinated three senior Palestinian leaders, those leaders were found residing in civilian apartments in Beirut—not in refugee camps.
This reality led to an open conflict between the armed Palestinian organizations and the Lebanese Army across the country in 1969, which ended with the signing of the Cairo Agreement—a deal that legitimized the armed Palestinian presence outside the camps, especially in the South. It also permitted those organizations to launch attacks into northern Israel from Lebanese territory with support from the Lebanese Army. This, in turn, prompted repeated Israeli raids on Lebanon.
In 1973, clashes between the army and the Palestinian factions erupted once again across the country. Although the army managed to fully regain control over the refugee camps—especially those in Beirut—the political authorities forced it to withdraw, and once again signed a new agreement with the Palestinian organizations: the Melkart Agreement of 1973, considered an annex to the Cairo Agreement, which once again legitimized Palestinian military activity on Lebanese soil.
Thus, the political leadership squandered in negotiations what the military institution had achieved on the battlefield, disregarding the strategic principle that "war is the continuation of politics by other means, and politics is the harvesting of war’s results."
The Lebanese government failed to capitalize on the army’s military victory and instead made concessions to Palestinian factions, who since 1973 had tightened their armed grip on the Lebanese people.
The right-wing Lebanese parties, particularly the Kataeb, National Liberal Party, Guardians of the Cedars, Al-Tanzim, and Marada, recognized that the Lebanese state was incapable of taking decisive action against the Palestinian military expansion in Lebanon.
The disagreement at the top of the Lebanese state about the legitimacy of Palestinian armed struggle and the role of the army rendered the leadership unable to address this major military threat—represented by the armed Palestinian presence and the behavior of its factions toward the Lebanese people.
Although the internal military conflict began on April 13, 1975, and clearly threatened national unity and Lebanon’s very future, the Defense Minister at the time continued—over the course of eleven months—to repeat the same line: “The army will split if deployed in the streets.” This rendered the country’s main military institution inactive and ineffective, confined to its barracks while soldiers watched their country destroyed, their people displaced, and their families killed.
The Lebanese Army remained without a role—a situation the army, broadly speaking, did not accept. Its units were deployed between front lines of the civil war without being authorized to prevent fighting or seize militant positions. Some units were even subordinated to the Internal Security Forces, an unusual arrangement in any formal military structure.
Orders were issued requiring soldiers to wear civilian clothes when traveling to and from home to avoid being recognized, kidnapped, or attacked by armed civilians.
The legitimate army remained sidelined, despite some of its units rebelling against central command and taking over barracks with Palestinian support, even threatening other military installations. This culminated in the March 11, 1976 coup led by the commander of Beirut's military zone against the legitimate government, which caused the disintegration of the remaining loyal army units and the formation of independent military commands in various Lebanese regions.
This led the aforementioned right-wing parties to adopt a solution of their own: to take on the military responsibility of confronting the Palestinian armed onslaught. These parties began training and arming their members to defend their communities and prevent total Palestinian domination over Lebanon.
From within the Kataeb Party, the Lebanese Forces emerged, continuing the Kataeb’s role under the leadership of its founding commander, Sheikh Bachir Gemayel, who worked to institutionalize the organization and structure it along traditional military lines.
The Lebanese Forces acquired a formal organizational structure following their relative independence from the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Front. Observers widely agree that the Lebanese Forces were the most advanced, well-equipped, and well-trained militia among the various Lebanese armed groups.
More importantly, they embodied the collective consciousness of Lebanese Christians, by raising the banner of defending their free and active existence in Lebanon.
The Lebanese Forces were officially formed a year after the outbreak of the civil war, with the aim of unifying military power in Christian areas. Sheikh Bachir Gemayel’s founding vision was clear: to unify the armed forces while preserving the political pluralism of the Christian parties and making them partners in decision-making.
References
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The breakdown of the state in Lebanon 1967-1976
أنطوان خويري
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الحرب في لبنان
دار الأبجدية للصحافة والطباعة والنشر, لبنان
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الاباتي بولس نعمان
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الإنسان الوطن الحرية: مذكّرات الأباتي بولس نعمان
أحصر كلامي بلبنان المعتدى عليه أرضًا وشعبًا، وبالأزمة التي حرّكها الفلسطينيّون ابتداء من النصف الثاني من الستينات، وأنهيه باستشهاد الشيخ بشير الجميل الرئيس المنتخب لجمهورية لبنان في 14 أيلول 1982. وقد كنت خلال هذه الفترة الزمنيّة إمّا عميدًا لكليّة الآداب في جامعة الروح القدس أو رئيسًا عامًّا للرهبانية اللبنانية المارونية وعضوًا في الجبهة اللبنانية، وفي كلتا الحالين، مسؤولًا في المجتمع المدني اللبناني. دخلتُ الأحداث بسبب الفراغ الهائل من جهة، وبسبب الخوف أو تنصّل المسؤولين من عمل الواجب المفروض تجاه إلحاح المجتمع المظلوم والمتألّم، ولم أتصرّف إلاّ برغبة ملحّة من رؤسائي بعد رجوعي من الإختصاص في روما، عندما قصد البطريركيّة المارونيّة بعض الشبّان اللبنانيين مدفوعين بغيرة صادقة وبشعور خفيّ بالخطر المحدق، طالبين الإرشاد والتوجيه من غبطة البطريرك الكاردينال مار بولس بطرس المعوشي، الرجل القوي والشخصيّة القائدة والبعيدة النظر، لأن الأحداث بدأت تتطوّر بسرعة، بعد حرب سنة 1967، وإتّفاق القاهرة سنة 1969، نحو الصراع المفتوح مع الفلسطينيين الذين كانوا يفتّشون عن وطن بديل، خصوصًا بعد فشل محاولاتهم لفرض سيطرتهم على الأردن في أيلول العام 1970. أرسل غبطة البطريرك هذه المجموعة من الشبان إلى قدس الأباتي بطرس القزّي الرئيس العام على الرهبنة اللبنانية المارونيّة، الذي أرشدهم بدوره إلى جامعة الروح القدس حيث كنت في ذلك الحين عميدًا لكلّية الآداب وأستاذًا للتاريخ ومكلّفًا من رئيس الجامعة الأب إسطفان صقر بالتحضير لإنشاء وإفتتاح قسم التاريخ وعلم الآثار. وقد طلبا منّي رسميًّا الإهتمام بأمر هؤلاء الشبان وإرشادهم ومرافقة إجتماعاتهم الدوريّة.
Kamal S. Salibi
1976
Crossroads to civil war: Lebanon, 1958-1976
The author give a thorough analysis of the series of political conflicts and crises that led to Lebanon's 1975 civil war.
