THE LEBANESE QUEST

The Lebanese Question project of the Middle East Institute for Research and Strategic Studies (MEIRSS) is a vision of a future in which the rule of law prevails and the values of democracy and peace take root. The center calls for informed decisions based on evidence and reason, away from conflicts and rigid ideologies, to achieve a decent life for all, where peace and equality prevail regardless of religion, ethnicity, or political affiliation.

The period from 1969 to 2005 in Lebanon witnessed pivotal milestones that contributed to shaping the Lebanese question in a complex manner, and the accumulation of crises led to the exacerbation of conflicts and wars whose consequences still cast a shadow on Lebanon today. These crises were triggered by the conflicting regional and local projects on Lebanese soil, as the Lebanese project sought to liberate Lebanon from regional hegemony and create an independent national sovereign identity, while regional projects sought to integrate Lebanon into their surroundings according to their authoritarian interests.

These crises triggered the Lebanese war in 1975, which was not a spur of the moment event, but rather accumulated pressure until it reached the point of explosion. This war affected all aspects of life, from politics and economics to infrastructure and the social fabric, with displacement and violations accompanied by deep suffering in all aspects of society.

In this context, our website plays a vital role as a reference that documents events and collects live testimonies, utilizing oral history, documentary films, official documents, and academic research. This initiative seeks to keep memory alive to ensure that tragedies are not repeated, by publishing articles, timelines, maps, documents, visuals, and podcasts that enable current generations to understand and preserve the past.

Despite the National Pact establishing a consensus on Lebanon’s identity—albeit an ambiguous one—it remained imprecise and unclear regarding its relationship with its Arab surroundings until the Taif Agreement. Moreover, it did not correspond to a specific legal or constitutional concept. The phrase "Lebanon with an Arab face" was interpreted differently: Muslims saw it as an expression of pan-Arabism, while Christians viewed it as an embodiment of Lebanese nationalism. As a result, disagreements over the country’s identity began to intensify, particularly as Arab nationalism pressed against Lebanon’s eastern borders in the 1950s. Muslims were strongly drawn to Nasserist pan-Arabism and the Egyptian-Syrian unity, while Maronites, deeply invested in the independent Lebanon they had helped shape, feared the prospect of it being absorbed into an Islamic unitary project disguised as pan-Arabism.

When Lebanon formally joined the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957 to shield itself from the repercussions of Nasserism, a deepening identity divide emerged. Muslims, in a populist display, marched on Damascus in support of Egyptian-Syrian unity (the United Arab Republic), demanding Lebanon’s inclusion, while a Maronite majority feared the assimilation of their culture and identity into an Arab-Islamic framework. By the summer of 1958, Lebanon descended into a brief internal war, driven by both domestic and external factors. The following year, a settlement between Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Fouad Chehab sought to neutralize Lebanon’s involvement in regional affairs—symbolized by their tent meeting on the Syria-Lebanon border in early 1959. This arrangement held until 1964, when the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) placed Lebanon at the center of the Palestinian military presence, the Palestinian cause, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly after 1967. Amid this regional turmoil, Lebanon’s contested identity fractured further. Muslims aligned with the Palestinian resistance as an expression of Arab nationalist sentiment, while simultaneously seeking to erode Maronite privileges under the pretext of historical injustice and deprivation. Meanwhile, the Lebanese left aimed to dismantle the sectarian system in favor of a secular one. On the other hand, more Christians gravitated toward Lebanese nationalism, fearing that Lebanon’s entanglement in regional conflicts would jeopardize their post-World War II economic and service-oriented role.

Interestingly, these divisions were not confined to the power hierarchy but extended to the broader street frenzy over the Palestinian Resistance. The Maronite Tripartite Alliance was established in 1968 not only to defend Lebanon but also to assert a Lebanese identity distinct from its surroundings, distance the country from the Arab-Israeli conflict, counter the Palestinian-Islamic-Leftist alliance, and strengthen the Lebanese army’s role in maintaining order.

As militarization spread across all sects, Prime Minister Rashid Karami resigned in April 1969 under pressure from his Sunni constituency, which demanded that the Palestinian Resistance be allowed to operate freely from Lebanon against Israel.

In the following sections, we will examine these crises, highlighting the most significant ones and their impact on the national situation.

The First Crisis: The Economic Rift

Despite Lebanon and Syria having gained independence and joined both the Arab League and the United Nations as fully sovereign states, they initially maintained a unified currency and customs system.

However, tensions began to surface between the two countries when Lebanon signed a monetary agreement with France on January 24, 1948, to protect the Lebanese lira from the depreciation affecting the French franc. Syria, having rejected a similar agreement, reacted sharply, and Islamic newspapers in Lebanon launched fierce attacks against the Lebanese government, accusing it of betraying national interests.

On March 8, 1950, an envoy dispatched by Syrian Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm delivered a formal notice to Lebanese Foreign Minister Philippe Takla, demanding that Lebanon choose between full economic unification with Syria or a complete economic rupture between the two countries. Lebanon was given until March 20 of that year to respond.

The Lebanese government, led by Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, rejected Syria’s notice and decided on economic disengagement on March 14. This decision split the Lebanese population into two camps: Christians, who supported the government’s stance without reservation, and Muslims, who were initially uneasy about the decision before strongly opposing it. The Lebanese Traders’ Association was similarly divided.

The press had already reflected these divisions and shaped public opinion accordingly. Beirut al-Masaa reported in early April that Muslims supported economic unity with Syria, while Al-Amal, the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Kataeb Party, wrote on April 9 that Christians opposed it. The country was engulfed in heated debate and political turmoil, which was not eased by Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh’s statement in Parliament on March 15, 1950. He declared that economic unity with Syria would be disastrous for Lebanon and of no real benefit to Syria—words clearly directed at Lebanese Muslims.

What ultimately countered Syria’s attempt to deepen Lebanon’s internal divisions through economic pressure was the success of Iraq and Egypt in attracting a portion of the Muslim community to their anti-Syrian policies. This created a balance within the Muslim street, and, combined with Christian support for the government’s position, helped stabilize the Lebanese stance and resolve the crisis.

The Second Crisis: The 1958 Events

At a time when the Arab Muslim world harbored deep resentment toward the West for its strong support of Israel—and when the West, particularly the United States, treated Egypt with disregard by refusing to supply it with weapons and withdrawing its loan commitment for the construction of the High Dam—Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had overthrown the monarchy in Egypt, was rapidly rising as a dominant figure in Arab politics.

Three key events contributed to Abdel Nasser’s emergence as a hero and a unifying force in the Arab world:

1. In March 1955, Abdel Nasser purchased weapons from the communist bloc.

2. He opposed the Baghdad Pact, which Iraq and Turkey had joined on February 24, 1955. In the eyes of Muslims, this pact represented a continuation of Western influence and colonialism. Abdel Nasser succeeded in signing an agreement with Syria on March 2 of that year against the Baghdad Pact, and Saudi Arabia later joined as a third party.

3. However, Abdel Nasser failed to bring Lebanon into this alliance. President Camille Chamoun rejected the agreement, fearing Nasser’s ambitions and Egyptian political dominance, and opposing the presence of foreign military forces on Lebanese soil that would not be under Lebanese authority.

The third key event was the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent Tripartite Aggression by Israel, France, and Britain in 1956.

Amid this military campaign, Lebanese Muslims—under Egyptian-Syrian influence—demanded that the Lebanese government sever ties with France and Britain, as Syria and Saudi Arabia had done. However, Camille Chamoun refused to comply, seeing no benefit in such a move, especially since the French and British forces had already begun withdrawing from the Egyptian territories they had occupied.

Internal divisions deepened further when Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957, a policy aimed at countering Soviet expansion. 

The resulting tensions heavily influenced the atmosphere surrounding the Lebanese parliamentary elections that took place that year. On May 30, 1957, massive demonstrations, unmistakably Nasserist in tone, spirit, and appearance, erupted in Beirut, leading to violent clashes with security forces. The elections were held in June, and their results aligned with the political stance of President Chamoun. The country became increasingly polarized, with an overwhelming majority of Christians supporting Chamoun’s policies and opposing Nasserism, while most Muslims rallied behind Nasser and opposed Chamoun.

In this heated climate, Syria and Egypt signed their union agreement on February 22, 1958. The realization of this unity ignited an unprecedented surge of enthusiasm among Lebanese Muslims, fueling their aspirations for Arab unification. Syria openly supported the Lebanese Muslim camp—politically, militarily, and financially. Syria’s strongman at the time, Abdel Hamid Al-Sarraj, and the Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, Abdel Hamid Ghaleb, did not conceal their blatant interference in Lebanese affairs. This alarmed Christians, heightening their wariness, anxiety, and fear. The spark that ignited the crisis in the spring of that year was the assassination of journalist Nassib Al-Metni on May 8. Lebanese Muslims viewed Prime Minister Sami Al-Solh and his cabinet’s Muslim ministers as traitors for continuing to support the president. Meanwhile, Lebanese Christians resented Army Commander Fouad Chehab for not allowing the military to suppress what they saw as “rebellion and insurrection.” Palestinian factions intervened in support of the Muslims, despite having no direct conflict with the government at the time.

The Lebanese crisis was brought before the Arab League Council on May 28 in Benghazi, but the council did not dare side with Lebanon, the party under attack. The issue was then raised at the UN Security Council on June 11, which merely sent observers—who failed to detect any arms or fighters crossing the Syrian-Lebanese border.

The situation remained volatile until July 14, when a coup in Iraq toppled the monarchy. This further inflamed the sentiments of Lebanese Muslims, prompting some members of the Internal Security Forces, police, and army to abandon their posts and join the armed insurgents. The Iraqi coup ultimately provided justification for U.S. Marines to land on the Lebanese coast the following day.

The U.S. military intervention was not aimed at saving Lebanon from the Nasserist conspiracy, nor at putting an end to the ongoing events. Rather, it was a precautionary measure against the possible expansion of Soviet influence following the Iraqi coup. However, the American intervention played a decisive role in securing the election of Army Commander Fouad Chehab as President of Lebanon, at the request of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Fouad Chehab was elected President on July 30, 1958, but he did not assume office until Camille Chamoun’s term had ended.

Following the formation of the first government on September 25, 1958, and the abduction of Fouad Haddad, the political analyst for the Al-Amal newspaper (affiliated with the Kataeb Party), on September 28, a counter-revolution erupted, led by the Kataeb Party and backed by the Christian community. This forced Fouad Chehab to form a new government, known as the "Government of Four," which restored calm to the country under the slogan "No victor, no vanquished."

The Third Crisis: The Cairo Agreement

In the mid-1960s, Palestinian Fedayeen operations began to take shape. The Palestinian organizations did not limit themselves to recruiting Palestinians; they also opened their ranks to Lebanese nationals. A majority of those who joined were Muslims, along with a significant number of fugitives from justice. The country became increasingly divided over the issue of Palestinian guerrilla activity. While Christians supported the Palestinian cause without reservation, they opposed Palestinian militant actions and feared Israeli reprisals that could harm Lebanon. On the other hand, Muslims backed the Palestinian operations and justified them. At the time, Lebanese Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Yafi stood on the balcony of the Grand Serail and declared his unconditional and absolute support for Palestinian Fedayeen, even providing them with weapons. During this period, the alliance between the Marxist left, Palestinian organizations, and the Lebanese Islamic movement grew significantly, to the point where the left became the official voice advocating for Islamic demands and Palestinian Fedayeen operations. This tripartite alliance exploited the Israeli raid on December 30, 1968, which targeted Middle East Airlines aircraft at Beirut International Airport, using it as an opportunity to launch a fierce campaign against the Lebanese army and government. As a result, Abdullah Al-Yafi’s government resigned, and Rashid Karami formed a new government at the end of January 1969. However, the situation continued to deteriorate. Faced with escalating tensions, Lebanese President Charles Helou issued a statement on May 31, 1969, reaffirming Lebanon’s support for the Palestinian cause while also opposing any threat to the country’s security and sovereignty.

The Muslim response to the president’s statement was immediate. Rashid Karami issued a declaration rejecting the president’s position and submitted his government’s resignation in protest. The Muslim community unanimously opposed the president and refused to participate in forming a new government. The crisis lasted a full six months until the Cairo Agreement was signed on November 3, 1969. Much has been said and written about this agreement, and discussions about it continue to this day. However, one undeniable fact remains: the Palestinians and their allies never adhered to the agreement, despite their repeated assertions of commitment to it. Christians rejected the agreement, even though the Lebanese signatory was the army commander—a Christian. However, some, notably the leader of the Kataeb Party, considered it the lesser of two evils. While the agreement was viewed as harmful, the alternative—civil war, which they sought to avoid by rejecting the agreement—was a far greater catastrophe. No one knew at the time that the war Christians had avoided in 1969 would break out just six years later.Rashid Karami withdrew his resignation, and Parliament approved the government’s statement, which referenced the Cairo Agreement without publicly declaring it or presenting it to the deputies. The crisis was put on hold, but the embers smoldered beneath the ashes.

The Fourth Crisis: Arab Countries Publicly Pressure Lebanon

At the end of March 1970, some clashes occurred between Palestinians and members of the Lebanese Kataeb Party. That same year, Charles Helou’s term ended, and Suleiman Frangieh was elected as the new president. The events of "Black September" unfolded in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and Gamal Abdel Nasser passed away on September 28.

"Black September" intensified the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Syria facilitated the passage of Palestinians into Lebanon through its territory. The leftist-Islamic-Palestinian alliance (backed by Syria to the fullest extent) became dominant on the Islamic street and was eager to find any opportunity to escalate the situation. This opportunity came on April 10, 1973, when an Israeli team, stationed in Beirut, assassinated three Palestinian leaders. The Lebanese army was accused of negligence, and Prime Minister Saeb Salam demanded the dismissal of the army commander. However, the president did not accede to the prime minister's request, leading to Salam’s resignation. Amin al-Hafez replaced Saeb Salam. Meanwhile, the Palestinians kidnapped three Lebanese soldiers. The Muslims called for Amin al-Hafez’s resignation, while the Palestinians refused to release the hostages. Following a clash between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians, Syria closed the borders. Arab ambassadors met with the president and pressured him to halt military operations against the Palestinians. The president yielded to Arab pressure, and the crisis froze once again. However, the embers of tension remained beneath the surface.